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l Presented jointly by the Polish and Swedish governments, the 
proposal for ‘Eastern Partnership’ is the first major Polish
initiative at the EU forum since accession that has every
chance to become a success due to the extensive
consultations that preceded its launch as well as its realistic
objectives.
l ‘Eastern Partnership’ constitutes an attempt to place the
traditional objectives of Poland’s Eastern policy within the
framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. As such,
it is a significant policy reversal as regards the ENP, which
was previously criticised in Poland for its alleged
ineffectiveness and privileging of the Southern dimension.
This reversal is part of a more general attempt by Donald
Tusk’s government to ‘Europeanise’ Polish foreign policy
through coalition building with both old and new EU
members.
l Although ‘Eastern Partnership’ has been rather well
received within the EU, a number of policy challenges remain 
in the way of its implementation. These challenges include the 
need to secure the support of the target countries for the
initiative and to achieve concrete results in Ukraine’s
progress towards greater integration with the EU.
Furthermore, positive results must be secured during the
French and Czech presidencies of the EU, and the foreign
policy opportunities provided by the upcoming Polish
presidency in 2011 must be utilized. Finally, given the
unyielding criticism of Tusk and Sikorski’s foreign policy by
President Lech Kaczynski and the main opposition party,
Law and Justice, constant efforts must be made to maintain
domestic support for these policies.
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‘Eastern Partnership’ initiative
The ‘Eastern Partnership’ proposal constitutes a brand new initiative by thePolish government aimed at counterbalancing the project of the Union for the Mediterranean advocated by the French president Nicolas Sarkozy. It is also
the first major Polish initiative at the EU forum since accession that has every
chance to become a success1. First of all, the project appeared to be well prepared: it
took the form of a joint Polish-Swedish proposal in order to avoid the impression
that the idea was coming from a single member state. Secondly, wide consultations
were conducted, and the preliminary agreement of Germany, Great Britain,
Denmark and Czech Republic was obtained. At the same time, France was made
aware of the fact that Poland was willing to support the strengthened Mediterranean
partnership only under the condition that a similar initiative could be designed for
the Eastern neighbourhood. Moreover, one day before the official presentation of
the project to the GAERC, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radek Sikorski,
held a special conference for Brussels-based journalists to explain the details and
benefits of the initiative, in order to shape the public opinion of EU member states.
Finally, directly before the GAERC meeting on the 26th of May, Sikorski addressed
a number of EU officials, diplomats, journalists and lobbyists gathered at a
‘breakfast briefing’ on the premises of the prestigious European Policy Centre in
Brussels2.
The contents of the Eastern Partnership proposal
To date, the proposal for ‘Eastern Partnership’ remains fairly general, withfurther details to be presented and discussed at the June European Council(concrete projects could be elaborated in Brussels by the end of this year).
The principal aim is to strengthen regional cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova,
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and to a certain extent with Belarus. The project
involves visa facilitation, with prospects for visa-free movement, a free trade zone
for services and agricultural products (including a date to be fixed for completion of
the free trade area), as well as closer cooperation in the fields of transport, the
environment and border control. There will be no extra burden on the EU budget,
except for what is already earmarked for these countries in the ENP financial
perspective for 2007–2013. If necessary, additional funds could also be obtained
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from the European Investment Bank and European Reconstruction and
Development Bank. Furthermore, no additional institutional arrangement, such as a 
secretariat in the case of the Union for Mediterranean, is foreseen. Finally, as the
initiative builds on the structures of the ENP, the European Commission is to play a
major role, with a Commission official appointed as ‘special coordinator’3.
Eastern Partnership and the prospects of further EU
enlargement to the East
The main question is whether ‘Eastern Partnership’ advances the issue ofmembership for at least some of the states concerned, notably Ukraine andMoldova. The document to be presented at the June European Summit will not
mention ‘a European perspective’ for these countries. However, Polish diplomats
believe that if EU consents to the project, it may attach more importance to Eastern
neighbours and as a consequence the chances for the future membership of Ukraine
and Moldova will significantly increase4. The whole concept draws on the experience 
of the Visegrad group, enabling the countries concerned to better integrate within the
grouping, while implementing internal reforms and adjusting to EU standards. This
helps them to prepare for accession, once ‘enlargement fatigue’ is gone and the EU is
politically prepared to make an offer5.
Reactions of the countries concerned
However, the project has raised doubts, not only in some of the EU memberstates, but also among the partner countries concerned, most importantly inUkraine. The political opposition in Poland also seems to be relatively
sceptical. The initiative is likely to see criticism from Bulgaria and Romania, fearing
that their ‘baby’ – the Black Sea Synergy – could be undermined by the new initiative. 
Moreover, Spain and Italy might be hesitant to endorse the proposal, due to their
strong emphasis on the Southern dimension of the ENP. Finally, uneasiness was
raised by the possible reaction of Russia to this reinforcement of EU policy in its
region of ‘strategic interest’. As regards Ukraine, their diplomatic head, Hennadij
Udovenko, reasserted that ‘any form of neighbourhood policy without membership
perspective cannot be satisfying to us’. Indeed, Ukraine might not see much
improvement in the proposal in comparison with the status quo. In particular, the
Polish proposal implies treating the East as a uniform entity, which is obviously
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beneficial in terms of acquiring funds for major regional and trans-national projects.
The idea is to balance the bilateral, EU – partner country aspect of the existing ENP.
However, Ukraine does not find it beneficial to be put into one basket with countries
such as Azerbaijan or Armenia, whose chances for membership are practically
non-existent at the moment.
Domestic reactions
The initiative was also received with reservation by the domestic opposition.Pawel Kowal, deputy of the PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwoœæ – Law and Justice)party and a specialist on Eastern policy, has criticized the government for
taking a timid and unambitious stance at the beginning of the negotiations. According 
to him, the proposal is certainly not revolutionary and happens to be nothing more
than a slight modification of the existing ENP. Moreover, it has not been developed
with consultation of the opposition and lacks concrete details as to how and when the
objectives of the partnership are to be achieved6. However, it is doubtful that these
objections are fully valid. Given the realistic objectives of the initiative, the chances
for its acceptance without being watered-down are quite high. The strategy of
incremental steps towards strengthening EU ties with its Eastern neighbourhood is far 
more promising than a big-bang approach that nobody will be willing to support.
Nevertheless, further details of the proposal are to be seen at the European Council
meeting 19–20 of June.
Eastern Partnership as an extension of Poland’s Eastern
policy after 1989
In order to better understand where Poland stands on the issues of ENP and Eastern policy it seems necessary to take a brief look at the developments after 1989.Particular attention should be devoted to the main ideas and policy actions that
were implemented after accession (2004), when Poland could finally act as the
member of the European club and actively contribute to the EU Eastern policy.
The meandering of Polish foreign policy cannot be properly understood without
careful consideration of its historical and geopolitical burden, in particular with
regards to Russia and Ukraine. The term ‘Eastern policy’ is itself deeply embedded in
the historical ideas of Polish emigration and opposition intellectuals, such as Jerzy
Giedroyæ and Juliusz Mieroszewski. Originally, the policy concerned Ukraine,
Lithuania, Belarus, and the Soviet republics whose territories partially belonged to
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Poland before the 2nd World War. This strategic concept implied reconciliation and
the rejection of imperial ambitions as well as territorial claims by both Poland and
Russia. The integrity and independence of the three neighbours was to be recognized
and guaranteed. After the fall of communism the main paradigm for the traditional
‘Eastern doctrine’ remained influential, although it could no longer serve as a basis
for strategic choices due to changed geopolitical circumstances.
The concept of an Eastern policy has been used constantly in Polish foreign policy
discourse since 1989, but its contents seem to have evolved over time and it has not
been uniformly employed towards its target countries. Poland’s ambition has always
been to promote democracy and economic development in Eastern Europe, while
exporting the success of its own transformation process. At the same time, each state
has been treated separately, and therefore it is difficult to find a common
denominator.  During the 1990s particular attention was paid to Ukraine and often to
Belarus, with Moldova and Georgia occasionally mentioned, whereas the rest of
Caucasus and Central Asia was often forgotten. A fundamental factor that adds to the
complexity of any strategy towards the East is Russia and its ambitions in the region,
which are now realized through economic rather than political domination. Poland
seems to be Russia’s natural adversary in the region, and bilateral relations have
never been easy. Russia’s permanent inability to come to grips with its own past as
well as with the history of relations with its neighbours does not facilitate
constructive dialogue and cooperation.
EU enlargement to the East and the creation of the ENP
The European Neighbourhood Policy was conceived on the eve of the so-called‘Eastern enlargement’ of the EU in order to support democratic transformationand economic development in the immediate neighbourhood. The ENP aimed
at integrating and consolidating EU actions towards its neighbouring countries. It was 
meant to become a crucial element of EU foreign policy, while securing EU borders
with a ‘ring of friends’. The original proposal was tabled by the UK and Denmark in
April 2002 in the form of the ‘New Neighbours Initiative’ that was originally directed
exclusively towards the East, covering Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.
As a candidate state, Poland took an active part in the process of elaborating EU
policy towards new Eastern neighbours after the enlargement, notably by means of
a ‘Non-paper’ presented at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002. In this
document the Polish government proposed an integrated policy consisting of
3 pillars: community, governmental (both bilateral and multilateral) and
non-governmental. Special attention was given to Ukraine, stipulating that the level
of its relations with the EU should be equal to those of EU-Russia. The project
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envisaged 5 areas of cooperation: enhanced political dialogue, assistance in the
transformation process, development of economic cooperation, energy cooperation
and cooperation in justice and home affairs.       
However, the European Commission soon came under intense pressure from France
and Spain to expand the project towards the Mediterranean and integrate the
Barcelona Process into the new framework. In addition, the ENP Strategy Paper from
May 2004 also included the Southern Caucasus. The Western Balkans and Turkey
were excluded from the process, as they already enjoyed the status of candidates or
‘potential candidates’. This differentiation has fuelled negative perceptions of the
ENP in Poland. Although participation in the ENP does not formally exclude future
accession, the widespread belief is that it does de facto define the frontiers of Europe7. 
Finally, relations with Russia have been designed within a separate formula of
‘strategic partnership’ to be realized within the framework of ‘four dimensions’.
Polish discontent with the ENP
The ENP has often been criticised in Poland as ineffective or inadequate in itsactions. Critics have also pointed out the tensions that exist between the ENPand the national polices of member states. Member states often act individually 
in pursuit of their own national interest, without respecting the need for common
action and solidarity. Moreover, critics complain that the Southern dimension of the
ENP is much more privileged over the Eastern dimension. In this perspective, the
appreciation of the East in the new ENP budget for the period 2007–2013 is hardly
recognized8. Critics of the ENP also seem to neglect the fact that the existing
weaknesses of the neighbourhood policy are deeply rooted in the dualistic nature of
EU external action. Both the member states and EU institutions manage EU foreign
policy. Member states do have conflicting interests and they would never subordinate
them completely to common interests, as defined by EU institutions. However, such
conflicts do not only concern the biggest member states, France and Germany, as it is
often claimed in Poland. The recent agreement between Russia and Bulgaria on the
South Stream pipeline clearly shows that the spirit of European solidarity is also
severely neglected in the new member states. Therefore, the ENP may appear
ambitious in its assumptions, but it is relatively weak and inconsistent in its responses
towards actual political challenges. 
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Polish eastern policy after 2004
The year 2004 should be regarded as an important turning point for the Polish Eastern
policy for two reasons:
n Fi r st ly, with the EU ac ces sion pro cess al re a dy co m p le ted, Po land had to shift its 
fo re ign po li cy pa ra digm from ‘adjusting’ to ‘making choices’9. This shift also im p -
lied in te gra ting Po lish in te rests and ob je c ti ves into EU po li cies, whi le re a ching agre e -
ment with ot her me m ber sta tes pro mo ting the ir own con fli c ting in te rests.
n Secondly, the Ukrainian Orange Revolution (XI–XII 2004) provided Polish
political and diplomatic elites with a major opportunity to mediate and influence the
resolution of the political conflict following the manipulated elections. It also
provided an opportunity to promote the European aspirations of Ukraine, and to
establish Poland as veritable EU specialists on the Eastern neighbourhood. The role
of President Aleksander Kwaœniewski and Polish members of the European
Parliament was crucial in placing the Ukrainian case high on the EU agenda. In fact, it 
is still being perceived as the most constructive and successful European initiative of
Polish representatives following the enlargement. 
Despite intense lobbying coming from both Poland and Baltic states, the Union’s
reaction to the ‘revolution’ was rather careful and did not meet the high expectations
of President Victor Yushchenko and his enthusiastic Polish advocates. No
declaration was issued with regard to the possible future EU membership of Ukraine.
The previously agreed Action Plan that aimed at implementing ENP priorities in
Ukraine was not opened for renegotiation with the new pro-European government.
This timid approach of the Commission and the Council of Ministers was widely
criticized in Ukraine and Poland. Despite all of this, the Action Plan was
complemented with an annex, which notably envisaged:
l Negotiating a new and strengthened free trade agreement,
l Active support for Ukraine’s membership in the WTO,
l Possible recognition of Ukraine as a functioning market economy (which is one of
the Copenhagen accession criteria and actually took place at the EU-Ukraine
summit in December 2005),
l Strengthened cooperation in the fields of energy, transport and visas,
l Increased access to European Investment Bank funding10.
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From the Polish point of view this offer was hardly adequate, and therefore discontent 
with the ENP formula intensified. The EU seemed to be interested only in developing
relations with Russia, at the expense of other Eastern countries that were struggling to 
free themselves from Russian domination. According to critics, the EU lacked both
vision and courage. On the other hand, Polish decision-makers had a clear tendency to 
underestimate certain important factors that contributed to the EU’s lukewarm
reactions to the Orange Revolution:
l EU ‘enlargement fatigue’ and its possible impact on the Constitutional Treaty
referendum in France (failed anyway in May 2005) and other member states, 
l Serious doubts about the unequivocally pro-European path of Ukraine (confirmed
to a certain extent by Victor Yanukovich’s victory in March 2006 parliamentary
elections),
l The EU already felt trapped with the controversial accession process of Turkey and 
wished to avoid the repetition of such a situation in the future.
Polish Eastern policy under the Law and Justice
Government
Throughout 2005, the declining leftist government of Poland seemed too weakto deliver major new initiatives in the international arena. In fact, the firstopportunity to define the Eastern policy in the new European environment was
given to the conservative – populist government led by the Law and Justice Party,
following their victory in the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections. Indeed,
President Lech Kaczyñski soon announced the opening of a whole new chapter in the
history of Polish foreign policy and a complete break with former practices.
According to the Kaczynskis, Polish national interest was particularly threatened by
German hegemony in the EU. Germany could not be perceived as a reliable partner
and certainly not as an ally for Poland with regard to Eastern policy. Germany’s
relations with Russia, as materialized in the North Stream pipeline project, were
self-evident in this respect. The EU’s lack of support for Ukrainian membership was
seen as another sign of short-sighted submissiveness towards Russia. Moreover, the
ENP, ill-designed and failing to respond adequately to Ukrainian aspirations, had be
treated with a great deal of reservation.
Consequently, cooperation with other member states is a priori rather difficult11.
Poland was obviously willing to discuss its priorities with all EU partners, but it was
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practically impossible to find understanding for its priorities without compromising
the national interest. In the end, the only credible ally for the Eastern policy was
Lithuania.
The Kaczynski government declared the urgent need for energy diversification.
Cooperation with Ukraine on an alternative pipeline was a top priority, and Poland
would be more active in the Caucasus region and Central Asia. According to PiS
decision-makers, the Russian embargo on Polish food products clearly showed that
Russia did not apply the principle of equal partnership towards Poland, a member of
the European Union. With EU reluctance to show any solidarity, Poland had no other
choice but to veto the EU mandate for negotiating the new Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement with Russia. The Polish government claimed that the new
tough stance towards Russia proved to be successful, as the EU, faced with the wave
of conflicts fuelled by Moscow with Estonia and Lithuania, finally demonstrated
much-needed unity in its dealings with Vladimir Putin. 
According to Anna Fotyga, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the PiS government, an
intensive political dialogue with Ukraine was conducted at all levels: between both
presidents and the governments. Poland claimed to be an advocate of Ukraine’s
European aspirations’12. As the reform momentum created by the Orange Revolution
weakened, Poland was convinced that Ukraine needed additional external stimulus –
in the form of an association agreement that would pave the way for the future
membership13. 
Some of the ‘achievements’ of the PiS government in Eastern policy are particularly
worth of mention. Due to its hostile attitude towards cooperation with Germany, the
PiS government easily dismissed the German presidency as not attaching enough
importance to the Eastern dimension of the ENP14. It neglected the project of ‘ENP
plus’ at the heart of the ‘Neue Ostpolitik’, which was the main goal of the Presidency,
next to the revival of the Constitutional Treaty15. The PiS government did not support
the initiative, despite the fact that it was more favourable to the East in terms of funds
redistribution than the final Commission proposal of a ‘strengthened ENP’. 
Another example of PiS failure in the area of Eastern policy is the case of visas for
Ukrainians, when Poland was preparing for joining the Schengen zone. Hungary and
Slovakia managed to prepare suitable solutions well in advance, whereas the PiS
government was working on legislation at the last moment and then handed the
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problem over to the next government, allowing for major problems at the borders and
Poland’s loss of reputation as a credible partner for Ukraine.
Is the PO-PSL government opening a new chapter
in the Polish Eastern policy?
The PiS foreign policy was openly and severely criticized by the opposition andmost foreign policy experts and this criticism seems to have contributed to thedefeat of PiS during the early elections held on 21 October 2007. The
victorious coalition of Civic Platform and the Polish Peasant Party (PO-PSL)
announced a new chapter in foreign policy.
PO is undoubtedly more enthusiastic towards the process of European integration. As
Prime Minister Donald Tusk asserted, Poland is determined to actively promote its
own vision of EU development, as a key actor in the European arena. At the same
time, cooperation within the Union has to be strengthened16. With regards to the
neighbourhood policy, Foreign Affairs Minister Radek Sikorski continued to
advocate the traditional Polish position, also shared by PiS, that in the East the EU
deals with European neighbours, whereas in the South – with the neighbours of
Europe. Also, the Eastern dimension of EU foreign policy should remain the Polish
spécialité de la maison17. Although these facts seem to point out that there is some
continuity between the policies of the Kaczynski and the Tusk government, the
latter’s policy differs from its predecessor’s in both style and substance.
Focus on coalition-building and new European initiatives
PO has clearly demonstrated a more active and alliance-prone approach inEuropean policy. At the December 2007 European Council, Poland and Lithuania proposed more focus on the multilateral framework of the
ENP, thus shifting attention away from the purely bilateral dealings of the EU with
each partner. According to Donald Tusk, Poland’s role as a leader of cooperation
within the Eastern dimension had been recognized and confirmed unanimously18.
The launch of a new and reinforced form of cooperation between Visegrad (Poland,
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) and the Baltic States had also been
announced during the summit. The seven partners declared the wish to come up with
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common positions and strategies before each European summit. This structured,
long-term collaboration includes a regional energy strategy to be concluded at the
summit organized in Poland, probably in September 200819. Moreover, Poland
actively responded to the French proposal of creating the Union for the
Mediterranean (UfM), a reinforced project for the Southern dimension of the ENP. At 
the March 2008 European Council, Donald Tusk agreed on a compromise to establish
UfM on the condition that a similar proposal would be considered for the East. An
intense consultation process with Paris, Berlin, Stockholm and Central European
capitals has been launched with a view to achieve progress on this matter during the
June European summit20.
Towards a strategic partnership with Germany?
On the other hand, German partners expect that the Eastern policy could finallybecome one of the most important common long-term interests in Warsawand Berlin’s foreign policy21. A common strategy in this respect could be
envisaged, which would undoubtedly give greater weight to Polish priorities and
interests in the East, while providing them a broader European context. This should
be facilitated by the fact that the PO government has been welcomed in Berlin with
great relief and hope for the active and constructive role Poland could play again at
the EU level, after two years of isolationism and open conflict22.
A more pragmatic approach towards Russia
Donald Tusk has also decided to adopt a very pragmatic approach in relationswith Russia. He declared his willingness to engage in dialogue on theconstruction of American anti-missile defence system in Poland in order to
show that in no way is it directed against Russia. Another step was to withdraw the
Polish veto on opening OECD membership negotiations with Russia. These signs of
trust and goodwill were welcomed in Moscow and the embargo on Polish food
products was partially lifted. Prime Minister’s Tusk official visit to Moscow in
February 2008 paved the way for some further improvement in mutual relations. At
the same time, Poland would no longer block negotiations on the new Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement with the EU, as European Commission guaranteed EU
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solidarity and support in energy issues23. This policy of détente was heavily criticized
by the former government’s officials, who accused Donald Tusk of favouring
relations with Russia over the strategic partnership with Ukraine. However, it is
worth underlining that the attempt to improve relations with Russia resulted in the
strengthening of the Polish position within the EU and consequently enabled Poland
to exert more pressure on Russia than in the past, when Poland acted unilaterally. On
the other hand, Poland is an important partner for Russia only in so far as it is an
important player in the EU itself.
Ukraine: going beyond declarations?
During his visit to Kiev in March 2008, Donald Tusk asserted thatPolish-Ukrainian relations are at the core of Polish foreign policy. Anagreement on small border movement was finally signed, ending the
regrettable situation Ukrainians faced, when Poland entered the Schengen zone.
Other concrete measures included:
l A protocol of intention on bilateral cooperation concerning the process of
Ukrainian integration with the EU, which should bring added value to Polish
efforts aimed at promoting Ukraine within the Union;
l An agreement on cooperation in matters of civil service, which may help Ukraine
in meeting EU good governance standards and thus contribute to the ENP Action
Plan objectives.
It seems therefore that the Tusk government has decided that Poland has to support
Ukraine in convincing other EU member states of Ukraine’s European commitment,
which is reflected in concrete results and successful reforms.
Backlash at home
The political consensus on foreign policy in Poland seems to belong to the past.PO was extremely critical of PiS’s ‘new paradigm’ in foreign policy, and nowPiS is going so far as to claim that the current government has ‘ruined’ all its
achievements and that the progress attained in the East is gradually being ‘destroyed’. 
They claim that under Tusk, Poland is returning to ‘clientelistic politics’, seeking
patronage from Germany. As the opposition leader, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, put it: ‘this
23  In fo r ma cja mi ni stra spraw za gra ni cz nych, op. cit.
is unrealistic politics, reflecting a lack of basic competence in foreign policy’24.
However, such criticism could be dismissed as evidence of a purely political battle for 
internal purposes based on electoral calculations aimed at winning support of
nationalist and euro-sceptic elements of public.
Conclusions: key challenges for Polish Eastern policy
The new government has indeed used the favourable momentum created at thevery beginning of its term in order to engage in a constructive dialogue bothwithin the EU and with Russia. At the same time, critics point out that bilateral
relations with Ukraine have been neglected. Some analysts have even gone so far as to 
declare that Polish-Ukrainian relations are ruined and that Donald Tusk has lost
Ukraine25. But as the current government argues, any progress on the European
perspective for Ukraine can only be achieved in Brussels and other European capitals. 
The recent Central European coalition has the potential to become a powerful
advocate for Eastern neighbours. With the project of ‘Eastern Partnership’, Poland is
trying to place itself among other big EU players. Nevertheless, details of a credible
and comprehensive strategy of the PO-PSL government with regards to the ENP have
yet to be seen.
l Eastern neighbourhood
Poland should demonstrate a truly positive attitude towards the ENP as a concept,
while discussing its deficiencies with EU partners. It should also actively promote
intra-EU alliances for more focus on the immediate Eastern neighbourhood that
includes Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. The initiative involving the Baltic and
Visegrad countries was clearly an important step in the right direction. The proposal
of Eastern Partnership has the potential to bridge the gap that the East is suffering
from, particularly in comparison with other initiatives such as the Northern
Dimension and Black Sea Synergy. In the aftermath of the agreement on the ‘Union
for the Mediterranean’ it is absolutely imperative for Poland to secure EU member
states’ support for this initiative. Indeed, the government has realized that such an
opportunity to reform the ENP in favour of Eastern neighbours may not appear again
in the next few years.
l Ukraine
The priority to support Ukraine’s European aspirations remains entirely valid. It
seems that Poland is finally backing declarations of support with concrete structured
measures that aim at helping Ukraine to deliver positive arguments to the EU. In the
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long run, Poland should aspire to the role Germany once played in the Polish
integration process with the EU. In the short-term, close cooperation with the
European Commission on the new ENP Action Plan for Ukraine is necessary, as the
Commission is to propose new initiatives that Poland could influence by favouring
Ukrainian preferences. The question of Schengen visas is a clear example of concrete
cooperation that was lacking for a long time. However, Poland also needs to take into
account the persistent political division of Ukraine and changes in subsequent
governments’ attitudes towards EU and Russia respectively.
l Russia & energy policy
Intense dialogue with Russia is a pragmatic necessity. However, in all areas of
potential conflict, Poland has to be assured of support from the EU, both from the
Commission and the member states. Russia cannot be allowed to play out the
differences between EU members.
A clear strategy towards the North Stream pipeline project has to be defined. Poland
needs to decide whether to join the environmental argumentation of the Nordic states,
or whether to participate in the project and build a branch from the main pipeline to
Poland. The first strategy could be supplemented by exerting pressure on the
Commission competition authorities to look at Gazprom’s increasingly monopolistic
position in the EU market, strengthened by the recent agreement with the Bulgarian
government on the South Stream pipeline. In this case, Poland should also consider
whether to seriously engage in the Ukrainian initiative to invest in the White Stream
pipeline that would transfer gas from Turkmenistan, through Azerbaijan and Georgia
to Ukraine, in the framework of a Trans-Caspian project26. Not only does the latter
offer an opportunity for true energy diversification in Europe, but it also provides a
strategic framework for EU cooperation with the Caucasus states and Central Asia.
Moreover, it places Ukraine at the heart of EU politics and could be an important
argument for the future association process.
 
l French and Czech presidency of the EU 
Poland has to consider the presidency rotation in the EU and its impact on the Eastern
dimension. After the Slovenian presidency, with its focus mostly on the Balkans, the
French presidency is bound to concentrate on the Mediterranean. However, it is the
Czech presidency in the first half of 2009 that might significantly contribute to the
realization of Polish Eastern priorities. Regular dialogue and intense diplomatic
effort within the new ‘7-Group’ is absolutely crucial in this respect.
14 ‘Eastern Partnership’ – opening a new chapter of Polish Eastern policy and the European Neighbourhood Policy?
Institute of  Public Affairs Analyses &  Opinions, 4
26 Ukra i nian Pri me Mi ni ster Yu lia Ty mo s hen ko an no un ced her pro po sal to bu ild the Whi te Stre am pi pe li ne du ring
her vi sit to Brus sels on 29 Ja nu a ry 2008. An dris Pie balgs, EU Com mis sio ner re spon si b le for ene r gy po li cy con fi r -
med that Ukra i ne sho uld play an im po r tant role in the con text of ene r gy dive rsi fi ca tion. 
l Forthcoming Polish presidency
Poland is to hold its presidency only in 2011. This timing provides significant
opportunities related to the new budget perspective for the ENP. On the other hand,
provided that the Lisbon Treaty enters into force, the Polish presidency will face the
need to cooperate with the permanent President of the European Council. This
involves clear constraints, but should also be perceived in terms of new opportunities, 
if the dialogue with the President is properly and timely structured.
l Dealing with potentially problematic areas of institutional and political nature
Last but not least, dualism in foreign policy between the government and the
President will remain a serious challenge for the cohesion and effectiveness of Polish
Eastern policy. Efforts have to be made to explain these policies to the public and to
secure domestic support despite strong criticism from the parliamentary opposition.
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